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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty 
to assault by a convict upon another convict with a 
deadly weapon, without malice aforethought, as a 
lesser included offense in the crime of assault by a 
convict upon another convict with a deadly weapon 
with malice aforethought. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found the appellant guilty of assault by 
a convict upon another convict, with a deadly 
weapon without malice aforethought, in violation 
of U.C.A. 76-7-11(Supp.1967). He was sentenced to 
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a further indeterminate term in the Utah State 
Prison, as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the judgment of the 
trial court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the facts as stated in appel· 
lant's brief with the following exceptions and addi-
tions. 
Drue Hunt Ross, a medical examiner at the Utah 
State Prison. testified that he examined prison guard 
fay Jones immediately after the altercation and that 
in his opinion the wound on Jones' neck was caused 
by a sharp instrument and that the injury could 
have been caused by a safety razor (T. 77). 
Glen M. Gardiner testified that while on duty 
at the Utah State Prison as a custodial officer, he was 
called on an emergency at approximately 11 :30 
a.m., April 1, 1967. In response to the question, 
"When you got to the cell block, will you tell us 
what occurred?" Mr. Gardiner testified (while refer-
ring to a diagram of the prison area involved): 
I started to open this door, and Ireland stated, 
"Don't come in this corridor, or I will kill him." 
Q. Now, where was this is Officer Jones, you say? 
A. Officer Jones. 
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Q. And they were approximately mid-way area; 
is that correct? 
A. Approximately, right in this area. 
Q. And how was he holding him? 
A. He had his left arm around his waist and his 
right arm around his right shoulder holding an 
object to the left side of his throat. 
Q. Did you see that object? 
A. I asked Ireland what he would like to do, and 
he said to go down, send one officer through 
the corridor to open this door and he would go 
into his cell and tum Officer Jones loose (T. 90). 
* * * * * 
Q. Okay, when you walked down the corridor, did 
you observe anything? 
A. I observed a razor in Ireland's hands. 
Q. And where did he have that razor or where was 
his hand located? 
A. His hand was around his right shoulder, and 
he was holding the razor to the left side of his 
throat (T. 91). 
Mr. Gardiner concluded by testifying that Ire-
land took guard Jones to inmate Jones' cell where 
inmate Jones held him until Ireland could get back 
to his cell (T. 91). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 




THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY 
TO FIND THAT THE APPELLANT COMMITTED AS-
SAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON UPON A GUARD 
WITHOUT MALICE AFORETHOUGHT. 
The testimony of Glen M. Gardiner established 
evidence from which the jury could find that the 
appellant did, in fact, hold a razor blade to the throat 
of Joy Jones. 
Instruction No. 1 (R. 42) charged the defendant, 
Steven A. Ireland, as follows: 
That on or about the 1st day of April, 1967, at the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the said Mike 
Patrick Jones and Steven A. Ireland, being convicts 
in the Utah State Prison, with malice aforethought, 
committed an assault upon Jay .Jones, guard at said 
prison, with deadly weapon, particularly a razor 
blade. (Emphasis added.) 
In instruction No. 10 (R. 48) the jury was told: 
A "deadly weapon" or ''instrument" is an object, 
instrument, or weapon, which used in the manner 
in which is appears to have been used, is capable of 
producing, and is likely to produce death or great 
bodily injury. 
A "deadly weapon" is such a weapon or instru-
ment as is made and designed for offensive or de-
fensive purposes, or for the destruction of life or the 
inflicting of injury. Acers v. United States, 164 U.S. 
388 (1895) 
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It is one likely to produce death or great bodily 
harm. People v. Fisher, 44 Cal.Rptr. 302, 234 C.A.2d 
189 (1965); Solitro v. State, Fla.App., 165 So.2d 223 
(1964) 
A deadly weapon is one which from the man-
ner used is calculated or likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. People v. Tophia, 167 C.A.2d 
39, 334 P.2d 133 (l 959) 
It is any weapon dangerous to life, or with 
which death may be easily and readily produced 
from the manner in which it is used. Williams v. 
State, 251 Ala. 397, 39 So.2d 37 (1948); Armijo v. Peo-
ple, 134 Colo. 344, 304 P.2d 633 (1956). 
A razor has been defined as: 
An article of common domestic use, and while no 
one could be held guilty of the offense of carrying a 
dangerous and deadly weapon concealed about his 
person, simply because he so carried a razor, yet if 
surrounding circumstances would tend to show that 
he carried it as a weapon of offense, he might be-
come liable to the charge, because a razor, when thus 
used, is notoriously a weapon dangerous to life. 
Ballentine, Law Dictionary with Pronounciations, 
P. 1088, (2nd ed. 1948); citing Brown v. State, 105 
Misc. 367, 62 So. 353 (1913). 
In Williams v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky 761, 202 
S.W. 2d 408 (1947) the defendant was accused of 
carrying a razor concealed on his person. The court 
held that a razor is a_ "deadly weapon" within the 
meaning of the statute against carrying a concealed 
deadly weapon. 
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In People v. Richardson, 176, C.A.2d 163, 1 Cal. 
Rptr. 306 (1959), the defendant was accused of cut-
ting af ellow prisoner with a razor blade. The court 
held that a razor blade, depending on the circum-
stances of its use, may be a deadly weapon. 
It is submitted that while a razor blade is not a 
deadly weapon per se, see French v. State, 73 
Okla.Cr. 141, 118 P.2d 664 (1941), it becomes a deadly 
weapon whe nused in a manner likely to produce 
death or great bodily injury. 
Respondent further submits that a razor blade 
held to a prison guard's throat is a deadly weapon 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §§76-7-11 and 
76-7-12 (Supp. 1967). 
The apparent conflict between the appellant's 
brief and the respondent's brief is over the issue of 
whether or not there was evidence of the appellant 
holding a razor blade to Officer Jones' throat. The 
appellant contends that there was no direct evi· 
dence establishing that a razor had been in fact used 
on Officer Jones. (Appellant's brief pp. 4-5.} 
Respondent submits that there was evidence 
presented from which the jury could find that the 
appellant held a razor blade to Officer Jones' throat. 
Although the record shows that the prosecution 
moved the court to amend the charge substituting 
the phrase, "with intent to do great bodily injury" 
for "with a deadly weapon particularly a razor 
blade" (T. 84) the motion was withdrawn (T. 93) and 
the complaint as read to the jury charged the ap-
• 
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pellant with assault by a convict with malice afore-
thought upon a prison guard with a deadly weapon, 
particularly a razor blade. (R. 42) 
CONCLUSION 
The information charges the appellant with as-
sault by a convict with malice aforethought on 
guard with a deadly weapon, particularly a razor 
blade. Instruction No. l advised the jury that the 
appellant was charged with assault on a prison 
guard with malice aforethought by a convict with 
a deadly weapon, particularly a razor blade. There 
was sufficient testimony to establish that the appel-
lant held a razor blade to the guard's throat. Re-
spondent submits that the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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